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ARGUMENT 
Appellee's counsel argues that the appeal of Respondent is frivolous (Appellee 
Brief, Page 13-16) and requests attorney's fees. (Appellee, hereafter referred to as "Mr. 
Alban" or "Appellee") While failing to follow the most basic rule of procedure and 
entering a notice of appearance of counsel with the court and opposing counsel, 
Appellee's counsel cavalierly suggests that the trial court need not consider the best 
interests of the children in adjusting downward the amount of alimony that Appellant, as 
the former wife and active guardian of the children, received in the original divorce 
decree. (Appellant, hereafter referred to as "Appellant" or "Ms. Alison," formerly Ms. 
Alban) That is wrong. Appellee's argument is antithetical to the welfare of these young 
children; a marked decrease in Ms. Alison's income coupled with the full-time job 
imputed by the trial court, without doubt, will be adverse to the children. Thus, it is 
respectfully submitted that the trial court's primary focus should be on the best interests 
of the children, rather than on the conduct of the parties during the marriage in matters 
that affect custody. Schindler v. Schindler, 116 P.2d 84 (Ut. App. 1989). One of the 
important factors that the trial court must consider is the "duration and depth of desire for 
custody" Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982). Utah case law and the 
statutory law of this State support this position. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 and 
30-3-5 (2007). 
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The definition of a frivolous appeal is one that is not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. Utah R. App. P. 33(b). A frivolous appeal is defined as one in which 
no justiciable question has been presented and appeal is readily recognizable as devoid of 
merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 
942, (Utah Ct. App., 1998). The opinion of the trial court below is devoid of specific and 
sufficient findings of fact regarding the drastic reduction of alimony ordered by the trial 
court. As stated below, the trial court seriously failed to consider the impact of the job of 
an airline pilot's unpredictable schedule on Appellant's ability to earn an income to 
maintain her standard of living as near as possible to that during the marriage. The trial 
court made no inquiry of how she would be capable of paying concurrently for child care 
while both she and the children's father were working. The trial court failed to even 
inquire into what child care would be provided or necessary during the absence of both 
parents due to work. 
A trial court is required to make adequate findings regarding the best interests of 
the children in custody matters. Sukin v. Suhin, 842 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1992). While 
the trial was cloaked as a petition to modify the divorce decree seeking a reduction in 
alimony based on the father's purported decrease in wages, the record reveals the father's 
true motive and focus, namely, a reduction in alimony without having to explain the 
effect on his children's care and custody arrangements. This was a deliberate end-run 
2 
IIHMIIM' i iisiod) issues linf were not before the court in order to hide the father's erratic 
schedule that shortchanged his children and affected real-time custody. 
Not surprisingly, Appellee argues that the appeal siioukl he rejei led .mil i usiiguies 
Appellant for ad\ ancingaposilioji lli.il r. I'tti beilrot.k el liie I !.S. Constitution and the 
I onshhition nl lliis Sfafe Yet Appellee never addresses these key Constitutional issues 
nor can Appellee counter UK !acN. Instead, Appellee seeks to divert the Court' . iiiicni i< m 
by attacking Appellant, It is respect lull) .lUhimlted lh;il ""i(i|r( Ire's In perbole should not 
bi euiHii.iteJ I ", nil1,,' mill .r; .1 si ibsiitute for consideration of the core issues. Among his 
most glaring omissions, Appellee's counsel makes no mention of Appellee's capricious 
choice to accept a work schedule that is convenie* • ru il: ^ irom 
earning a liveliho* hildren. This disparity is the crux of this appeal, 
~\\ li»< (i is corroborated by statutory and constitutional a 
ourt never made an evidential1} inquir\ into who would take care of 
the young children when it required Appellant to engage m a ;un -i :JII job it » MI| »| »< >i i 
herself and her children, imposed a severe redi 1 c 1 • \-ised upon putative 
iM'.'Minc sails e\ idm* e hv Appellee, and compounded \\s errors by allowing the Appellee-
father to fly around the country at his whim and the w him ul in* empk;> LI •« r, 
the district court apparently did not consider Apj * . . • financially survive 
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on the paltry sum of $500 a month — an amount far below her standard of living during 
the marriage and grossly inadequate to support her young children. 
Of equal import is the disparity between income imputed to Ms. Alison by the trial 
court and its decrease in alimony. The trial court reduced Ms. Alison's alimony by 
approximately 83%. It apparently considered Mr. Alban's representation that his income 
would be reduced by 32%. Even if the additional phantom income of 25% is attributed to 
Ms. Alison (without any evidentiary support), that amounts, at most, to a 57% reduction; 
yet the trial court inexplicably reduced the alimony by another 26%. This virtual 
elimination of alimony to Ms. Alison is neither factually nor legally supported in the 
record below. The trial court never considered scheduling a hearing in 2008 to determine 
the facts of income and care of the children before reducing the mother to poverty if a 
possible job imputed by the court did not come to fruition. 
While the law allows Ms. Alison to seek a modification of the divorce decree 
again in 2008 based on the then current facts rather than speculation, it was reversible 
error for the trial court to be "gambling" with the best interests of the children by 
speculating without more factual inquiry. The trial record does not even discuss the 
apportionment of payment for child care when Mr. Alban was traveling in his job, which 
could be substantial to a mother just entering the workforce. Rather, the trial court just 
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assumed it could be shared or the mother would adjust her schedule with a full time job 
to meet Mr. Alban's unpredictable schedule. 
Appellee's counsel argues on Page 7 of Appellee's Brief, "The appellant's brief is 
an emotional plea devoid of legal authority and legal analysis." Unfortunately, divorces 
are emotionally charged and citation to the 14 Amendment to the United States 
Constitution does not require case law to understand gender discrimination; nevertheless, 
sufficient case law was cited in Appellant's Brief to provide this Court with the standards 
for reviewing and rectifying the errors of the trial court below. In awarding alimony, 
appellate courts require the trial court to consider each of the following three factors: (1) 
the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income; and, (3) the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide support. Besides these three factors, the appellate court will examine whether a 
serious inequity has occurred as to result in a clear abuse of discretion. 
In this case, multiple reasons warrant review and reversal by this Court. The 
ultimate test of an alimony award is whether the party receiving alimony will be able to 
support himself or herself as nearly as possible at the standard of living during the 
marriage. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993). It is reversible error if the 
trial court fails to make specific findings on all material issues, unless the facts in the 
record are clear, uncontroverted and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
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judgment. Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988). In this 
case a serious inequity has resulted, and the trial court's findings of fact were not clear, 
uncontroverted and capable of supporting the judgment. The trial court impermissibly 
engaged in rank speculation as to what career path Ms. Alison should pursue. 
Concomitantly, the lower court erroneously failed to recognize the best interests of the 
children; the trial court likewise did not provide an alternative to Ms. Alison and her 
children if the vocation envisioned for Ms. Alison did not come about in January of 2008. 
In like fashion, the trial court failed to analyze the impact that Mr. Alban's extensive time 
away from his children (despite demanding joint custody) would have on Ms. Alison's 
ability to realize the income imputed by the lower court. In short, the record is barren of 
how Dillon, the youngest of the two siblings who was 11 years old at the time of the trial 
could survive day to day when the trial court accepted that both parents could have 
conflicting schedules. Instead, the trial court implicitly, if not expressly decided that the 
woman remain at home while the father jet around, though the trial court expected Ms. 
Alison to bear the double burden of taking care of her young children and working full-
time. In contrast, Mr. Alban was free to work as he pleased with no obligation to remain 
at home with the children. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with being a pilot for Delta Airlines, however, 
Mr. Alban has made a life-style choice that he prefers to fly instead of accepting a job 
that will allow him regular and frequent time with his young children. The trial court 
erroneously allowed Mr. Alban to have his cake and eat it too. Because desire for 
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custody is a criteria and because Ms. Alison has demonstrated her unwavering 
commitment for the care and custody of the children, it was reversible error for the trial 
court to preserve Mr. Albanfs subjective work schedule while reducing significantly his 
financial obligations ~ all to the detriment of the children. 
In an Equal Protection challenge to a Utah statute, the United States Supreme 
Court stated in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1973), " No longer is the female destined 
solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace 
and the world of ideas." The trial court, as a state actor, in effect has relegated Ms. Alison 
to a career as a school teacher, a career formerly thought of as a woman's arena, while 
providing her former husband the excitement, social interaction and prestige associated 
with being a pilot for Delta Airlines, a world formerly thought of as a man's domain. 
The trial court's approach to this alimony dispute resonates with gender disparity and 
seems to be bottomed upon gender discrimination in direct violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 
Utah Constitution. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order the parties to a divorce 
proceeding to pay their own attorney's fees and costs without making findings as to Ms. 
Alison's need, Mr. Alban's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. 
Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The trial court ordered both parties to 
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pay their own attorney fees, but made no specific findings about either party's need for or 
ability to pay attorney fees which requires remand for reconsideration and the entry of 
findings. Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah App. 1999). Because of the 
drastic reduction in alimony ordered by the trial court, Ms. Alison should have been 
awarded attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon these legal authorities and facts, Ms. Alison respectfully requests this 
Court to correct the errors committed by the trial court, eliminate the vestiges of gender 
discrimination that appear to have been injected by the lower court and protect the 
interests of the children. For these reasons, the lower court's ruling should be reversed 
and this case should be remanded for a complete evidentiary hearing that comports with 
the laws of this State, particularly the goal of the Legislature and the Judiciary to ensure 
that the welfare of young children is paramount to disputes between the parents in a 
divorce. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of October, 2007. 
Donald EfLittle 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
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